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Abstract. Digital forensic investigators commonly use dynamic malware 
analysis methods to analyze a suspect executable found during a post-mortem 
analysis of the victim’s computer. Unfortunately, currently proposed dynamic 
malware analysis methods and sandbox solutions have a number of limitations 
that may lead the investigators to ambiguous conclusions. In this research, the 
limitations of the use of current dynamic malware analysis methods in digital 
forensic investigations are highlighted. In addition, a method to profile dynamic 
kernel memory to complement currently proposed dynamic profiling techniques 
is proposed. The proposed method will allow investigators to automate the 
identification of malicious kernel objects during a post-mortem analysis of the 
victim’s acquired memory. The method is implemented in a prototype malware 
analysis environment to automate the process of profiling malicious kernel 
objects and assist malware forensic investigation. Finally, a case study is given 
to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed approach. 
Keywords: Dynamic Malware Analysis, Kernel Object Profiling, Malware 
Investigation, Memory Forensics, Post-Mortem Analysis. 
1. Introduction  
Malware, or malicious software, has become a commonly used tool to commit 
crimes on the Internet, and poses significant threat to the security of computer 
systems and privacy of computer users. To defend against malware, a large body of 
computer security research has resulted in various techniques to analyze, detect and 
eliminate malware [1-8]. Although proposed approaches assist malware analysts in 
accomplishing their mission, advanced malware countermeasure techniques have 
been developed to generate variants of the malicious code in an attempt to elude 
detection from traditional methods. Further, the substantial increase in discovered 
malware samples every day negatively impacts the effectiveness of traditional static 
analysis approaches. As such, highly automated dynamic techniques have been called 
for [9]. A variety of automated dynamic malware analysis approaches have been 
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proposed to cope with the large number of discovered malware samples. These 
dynamic methods were implemented in various sandbox solutions to provide the 
required process automation, and assist malware analysts in acquiring required 
knowledge about the malicious code’s behavior [10]. A sandbox, in this work, refers 
to a managed virtual environment with a pre-determined software configuration used 
to implement proposed methods and to observe a behavior of a malicious binary 
through its execution process [10].     
From a digital forensic investigation perspective, when investigators are 
confronted with an investigation involving a suspect executable, different incident 
response procedures are followed to analyze and investigate the suspect binary. 
Dynamic malware analysis methods proposed in computer security research are 
commonly used to allow an investigator to understand the behavior of a suspect 
executable. Analysis of extracted traces, correlating evidence and artifacts to the 
suspect executables’ behavior, however, is manually conducted by the investigator, 
and solely relies on his or her expertise. This manual process is time consuming, error 
prone and allows for inconsistent interpretation of malicious evidence which threatens 
the integrity of the investigation [11]. Moreover, the use of dynamic malware analysis 
methods for forensic investigation purposes has a number of limitations. Currently 
proposed methods are designed to assess the behavior of malicious code for signature 
development purposes, and have not been designed specifically considering the 
concepts and principles of digital forensic investigations. Thus, employing these 
methods in malware forensic investigations may result inaccurate conclusion. 
This work highlights the limitations of the use of currently proposed dynamic 
malware analysis methods applied to digital forensic investigations, and proposes a 
set of improvements to utilize these methods for forensic investigation purposes. To 
this end, a method for dynamically profiling the kernel memory of malware objects is 
proposed. The proposed method allows for automated identification and extraction of 
malicious kernel objects from a victim’s acquired forensic memory image during a 
post-mortem forensic analysis. In addition, it can be extended to profile different 
behavioral aspects of malware execution, and allow an investigator to automate the 
process of malware traces detection in a post-mortem forensic analysis of the victim’s 
computer system. To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed method, a 
prototype forensic-specific dynamic analysis sandbox solution has been developed 
and implements the proposed profiling technique. Developed sandbox is evaluated 
through a case study involving profiling a commonly used malware tool-kit that 
emerged over the last few years to commit financial crimes on the Internet. 
Developed profiles are then used to automate the analysis of dynamic kernel memory 
during post-mortem forensic analysis and automatically identify malware related 
kernel objects. 
 
To summarize, the contribution of this paper is as follows: 
 This work highlights the limitations of the use of currently proposed 
dynamic analysis methods in malware forensic investigations, and outlines 
required improvements to utilize the capabilities of these methods for digital 
forensic investigation purposes. 
 This work proposes a dynamic profiling method applied to dynamic kernel 
memory to automate the process of identification and extraction of malicious 
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kernel objects in acquired forensic memory images during a post-mortem 
forensic analysis. 
 This work present a prototype dynamic malware analysis sandbox for digital 
forensic investigation purpose based on the proposed dynamic kernel 
memory profiling method.  
Paper Organization. In section 2, limitations of currently proposed dynamic 
malware analysis methods in forensic investigations are described. In section 3, 
profiling of dynamic kernel memory for digital forensic investigation purposes is 
presented and described in details. Section 4 describes the prototype implementation 
of the proposed approach, and gives a case study. Section 5 gives a discussion about 
the proposed method and outlines future research work. Finally, section 6 concludes 
the paper.   
2. Limitations of Dynamic Analysis Methods From a Digital 
Forensic Investigation Perspective  
Dynamic analysis of malware is an automated approach to identify a behavior of 
malicious program through observation of the program’s execution in a managed 
environment [12]. Typically, malicious programs are automatically loaded into a 
managed virtual machine environment and executed. Interactions between the 
malicious program and an operating system are observed to provide human analysts 
an overview about the sample’s behavior and whether further analysis is required or 
not. Observed interactions of the malicious program in monitored operating systems 
include which system calls are invoked, and arguments used to interact with the 
operating system kernel. Finally, a detailed report about the program’s activities, i.e. 
file activities, Windows Registry activities, and networking activities, are provided to 
the analyst. Such information allows a human analyst to identify if a program under 
analysis is a new malware sample, a variant sample or a benign program. Based on 
the analyst’s decision, proper detection signature is developed. In contrast, a number 
of anti-analysis techniques have been developed by malware authors to disrupt 
malware analysis process, and impede further investigations [13, 14].  
Although currently proposed dynamic analysis methods substantially automate 
and improve the process of malware analysis and malicious code signature 
development in computer security research, the use of these methods is limited in 
digital forensic investigations. Thus, a part of malware analysis for digital forensic 
investigations is accomplished manually despite the fact that it can be automated, if 
digital forensic investigation objectives were initially considered and integrated into 
the design of these methods. More important, relying on results of currently proposed 
methods may contribute in resulting inaccurate forensic investigation conclusions. 
This section highlights a number of limitations that hinder utilization of currently 
proposed dynamic malware analysis methods in digital forensic investigations, and 
proposes a set of improvements that, if considered, assist in automating malware 
investigation and preserve the integrity forensic analysis.  
 
4        
2.1 Multiple Malicious Execution Paths 
Malware developers employ different methods to impede dynamic analysis of 
malware and malicious code investigation [14]. A prevalent feature in malware is the 
frequent collection of intelligence about the surrounding environment and attempting 
to detect whether it is an analysis or debugging environment. If an analysis 
environment is detected, malware may suppress its execution and terminate malicious 
payload installation, or may execute a different execution path that results in benign 
traces in an attempt to evade the human analyst. This behavior is termed “malware’s 
evasion personalities” [15]. To defend against evasion personalities, various 
approaches have been proposed to disguise the analysis environment, so that, it 
becomes transparent to a malware. Although proposed disguising methods to defend 
against evasion personalities substantially contribute to the intended analysis goal, a 
possibility of existence of multiple execution paths is still valid. Malware may have 
different malicious payloads or have different behaviors based on certain properties of 
the compromised environment: the existence of a predetermined Internet browser 
version, or installation of specific software or hardware, for example. Since currently 
implemented dynamic analysis methods do not consider tracking multiple execution 
paths [16] and developed sandbox solutions cannot consider all possible environment 
configurations, analysis may result in an execution path that has never been executed 
on the victim system subject of forensics investigation. This incomplete analysis 
could lead digital forensic investigators to reach an invalid conclusion based on 
incomplete knowledge of the behavior of the malware.  
To overcome multiple execution paths in computer security research, paths 
tracking techniques have been proposed to execute all possible paths in malicious 
programs [16]. Unfortunately, proposed techniques are computationally expensive 
when applied to thousands of malware samples collected every day. 
Investigation of all possible malware execution paths can be associated with 
observations of the state of the system to determine possible explanations that could 
have resulted in observed system state. Formal theories have been proposed to 
provide required explanations in the context of multiple execution paths, and to 
reconstruct events related to a certain execution path [17, 18]. Although these theories 
have applications in different forensic investigation domains, an application to 
malware evasion personality detection is still missing. Thus, inclusion of these 
approaches to malware analysis provides more information to assist investigators in 
deriving reasonable conclusions.    
2.2 Interrelation Between Observed Objects 
Dynamic malware analysis methods monitor the interactions between a malware 
sample and an operating system kernel [19, 20], e.g. invoked system calls and its 
arguments. Other methods, such as those proposed in [21, 22] not only observe 
objects interactions, but also, profile the interaction patterns such as evolving pattern 
of a malicious object’s data structure in dynamic kernel memory. Profiled patterns are 
further used to derive a malware detection signature. In digital forensic investigations 
of malware, interrelations between observed objects are essential to deduction of 
further actions invoked by a malicious object [23]. If relations between observed 
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objects are not properly defined, it may not be possible to infer an instance of an 
action. That is, investigators are required to manually define the relations between 
observed objects. Currently proposed dynamic malware analysis methods do not 
observe and define the mutual relation between malicious objects, although, there are 
various extensions that can provide necessary information about malicious objects 
interrelationships [24].   
Different methods allow tracking information flow between objects, denoted as 
dynamic taint analysis, which is considered a complementary approach to dynamic 
analysis approaches [25]. In dynamic taint tracking, information is labeled and 
tracked throughout program execution for different purposes. More precisely, 
propagation of labeled information in dynamic tainting systems is tracked in the 
context of a malicious objects’ execution. Currently proposed dynamic tainting and 
tracking systems focus on tracking data between objects; however, data propagation 
paths can be used to derive the interrelations between observed objects.  Such derived 
information allows automation of the process of object interrelation construction, and 
allows investigators to infer further actions based on defined objects relationships. 
That is, extending dynamic taint tracking to consider dynamic identification of 
interrelationships between observed malicious objects and integration of such 
methods in dynamic analysis approaches is essential for digital forensic investigation, 
and assists investigators in automating the forensic analysis processes based on object 
relationships.   
2.3 Profiling Dynamic Kernel Objects 
Memory forensics is an important portion of digital forensic investigation process 
when malware is concerned. Various signature-based approaches have been proposed 
to extract kernel data structures from dynamic kernel memory [26]. These methods 
scan the dynamic kernel memory to detect and extract different kernel data structure 
types such as processes, threads, network or VAD objects in Windows operating 
system kernel [27, 28]. Forensic analysis of extracted objects, and determining if an 
object belongs to a malware, is a manual process that relies on the investigator’s 
expertise. Forensic analysis of kernel data structure objects requires, as well, deep 
knowledge of the operating system internals and techniques employed by malware to 
disrupt investigation through the manipulation of the kernel object characteristics. 
Moreover, specification of the kernel data structures are likely to change with new 
builds of the operating system kernel. Thus, manual investigation of the kernel data 
structure in acquired memory is a significant challenge for forensic investigators.    
In computer security research, different approaches have been proposed for 
automated profiling of kernel objects characteristics in dynamic kernel memory, to 
assist malware signature development process [22]. Proposed methods are designed to 
identify the evolving patterns of kernel data structures in memory and profile such 
pattern. However, these methods are insufficient for forensic analysis of kernel data 
structure, as they do not allow for automated identification of malicious objects in 
post-mortem forensic investigations based on developed profiles.  
Profiling for digital forensic investigation purposes has been proposed in 
different investigative domains [29]. However, profiling malware behavior for digital 
forensic investigation is still missing. A profiling method to automate forensic 
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identification and extraction of malicious objects will, significantly, assist the process 
of malware forensic investigation and memory forensic analysis.  
3 Profiling Dynamic Kernel Memory 
In this section, a method for profiling dynamic kernel memory for digital forensic 
investigation purposes is presented. The proposed method allows for automated 
identification of malicious kernel objects in post-mortem forensic analysis of acquired 
memory.  
Dynamic kernel memory is a memory portion where dynamically allocated 
kernel data structure objects are present. Dynamic kernel memory recently became a 
target of an increasing amount of kernel level malware such as rootkit attacks [30]. 
These attacks employ advanced stealth techniques to control and manipulate an 
operating system kernel. For example, Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) 
attack allows rootkits to hide malicious kernel objects in the operating system kernel 
through manipulation of malicious kernel object’s characteristics [30]. Other attacks 
such as hijacking kernel execution – denoted as Kernel Object Hooking attack (KOH) 
[31]– allow kernel level malware to execute compromised code after hijacking the 
kernel code control flow.  
Digital forensic investigators of dynamic memory are required to investigate 
various kernel level data structure types to identify a presence of rootkits, and 
existence of malicious kernel objects. As previously discussed, this investigative 
process has limitations that may compromise the investigation’s integrity. Thus, an 
approach for automated forensic investigation of dynamic kernel objects is required. 
In the proposed method, a procedure to monitor kernel object’s characteristics is 
proposed and utilized to develop a profile for malicious kernel objects. Developed 
profiles will allow investigators to automatically determine kernel objects related to 
malware in an acquired forensic memory image during post-mortem forensic analysis 
based on Object-To-Profiles matching procedure.     
3.1 Profiling Malicious Kernel Objects for Forensic Investigation Purposes 
Program execution process in the operating system requires allocation of memory 
regions to the program to execute its instructions, and creation of kernel objects in 
dynamic kernel memory to manage the program execution. These kernel objects 
control every aspect of the program’s execution in the operating system kernel. For 
example, EPROCESS in Windows operating systems [32] or task_struct in 
UNIX based systems represent and manage running program’s processes and threads 
in the operating system kernel.  
Since kernel object data structures are formally defined by the operating system 
code, and instances of these objects are allocated in dynamic kernel memory, 
investigators attempt to differentiate between benign kernel objects and malicious 
kernel objects. This process is essential to determine which memory regions are 
allocated to malware, and which regions are suspicious but non-conclusive and 
require further analysis. 
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To automate the process of malicious kernel object identification in post-mortem 
memory analysis, the proposed method profiles the characteristics of a malicious 
kernel objects in dynamic kernel memory. When a program is being executed in, there 
exist a unique set of characteristics of kernel object’s properties that identifies the 
program. Determining such characteristics and monitoring its values, while program 
code is being executed, allows for development of an object profile that can be used 
to assist kernel objects investigation. To determine characteristics of malicious kernel 
objects, memory monitoring and introspection technique are employed to observe 
memory regions allocated to the dynamic kernel objects.        
The proposed profiling process model is shown in Figure 1. A malicious code 
executed instructions are monitored through a dynamic analysis method in a managed 
virtual environment. Through malicious code execution, snapshots of memory 
allocated to the kernel objects that represent malware execution is acquired at each 
executed instruction, and are added to the object profile for further use in a digital 
forensic investigation. Acquired memory snapshots are automatically matched to the 
kernel object’s definition to identify kernel object property values and determine 
values that have changed as a result of instructions execution.  Finally, at post-mortem 
memory investigation, developed profiles are used to automate malicious kernel 
object identification. This is accomplished by extracting dynamic kernel objects from 
acquired memory and automatically match extracted objects with developed profiles.     
3.2 Kernel Object Memory Profiling Formalization  
      This section presents a formalization used in profiling memory allocated to 
malicious kernel objects, and determining object properties at different execution 
states. A malicious kernel object    represents a malicious code execution in an 
operating system kernel. Memory region   is a dynamic kernel memory space 
allocated to   . A kernel object    holds a set of properties    that used by the 
operating system kernel to manage the program execution, such that:  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Kernel Object Profiler Process Model 
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   {       |    is allocated at memory offset                         
 
A Forensic Kernel Object Profile (OP) is a set of elements that represent memory 
snapshots for memory allocated to the kernel object    through execution of a 
program represented by   . An element in the set is called kernel object’s memory 
snapshot     at an executed instruction    and is defined as a set of 2-tuples        , 
where    represents a memory offset for a kernel object property      and    
represents a value assigned to property    as a result of an execution state  , such 
that: 
                                          
 
Figure 2 presents an example of forensic kernel object profiling of the EPROCESS 
dynamic kernel object in Windows operating system kernel. The rounded boxes in 
Figure 2 show various kernel object’s memory snapshot     at different executed 
instructions. For example, at the initialization state, the operating system initializes 
properties of a kernel object through assigning a process name, unique process id, 
initializing the process kernel information, determining control flags and assigning 
proper access security token at offsets, +0x154, +0x084, +0x000, +0x248 and 
+0x0c8, respectively [32]. Through program execution, properties of the kernel object 
are changed to allow the program to execute intended code, i.e. new security flags are 
assigned and existing control flags are updated, etc. 
Thus, according to presented profiling method, different kernel object snapshots     
for dynamic memory allocated to the object are acquired. For example, at instruction 
execution state       , characteristics of profiled kernel object are defined as:  
 
                                                                
 
and the Forensic Kernel Object Profile (OP), is defined as: 
 
                                                              
 
Fundamentally, profiled memory snapshots encode changes in the object properties at 
different execution states, and determine characteristics of profiled object at every 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: an Example of Kernel Object Profile 
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execution state. The observed changes in monitored object properties, results in a 
unique property updates pattern that allows for development of a malicious kernel 
object profile and assists in differentiating malicious kernel objects from benign 
kernel objects.   
To accurately profile properties of a specific kernel object, some properties in 
kernel object definition may include host or user specific data, e.g. timestamp of the 
object creation or user directory of downloaded malicious programs, etc. Such 
information is specific to the analysis environment configuration and may contribute 
to inaccurate profiles. Thus, kernel object properties of interest – and that are 
considered in profiling process – are properties that affect program execution in the 
operating system kernel and, if tampered with, monitored program may produce 
unpredictable behavior [33, 38]. Thus, user or host specific information is defined as a 
set of properties     and are excluded from profiling process. Hence, a final profile 
denoted as          is formalized as follow: 
           ⋃       ⋂    
     
 
 
 
This formula represents the process of profiling a memory snapshot of a kernel object 
of interest at different instruction execution states. To generalize developed profiles 
and exclude properties that may produce false negative results, user specific 
information such as, process id, user timestamps or an executable location, are 
eliminated from profiling process and kernel specific properties are only considered in 
the profiling procedure.  
3.3 From Malicious Code Execution to Object Profiles 
As previously illustrated, memory regions allocated to a malicious kernel objects 
are profiled to determine the object characteristics in different execution states. This 
section presents a formalization of code execution states that stimulate presented 
profiling process. A malicious executable P is modeled as a binary program that holds 
a set of assembly language instructions              . The execution of the 
malicious program P possesses a sequential execution of instruction set I in P with an 
exception to instructions that change program control-flow, e.g. jump instructions. 
Consequently, malicious program execution can be presented as a control flow graph 
(CFG) [34, 39]. CFG (P) can be defined as 2-tuple      , where S    is an execution 
state presented as assembly instructions, and E is a set of edges      ,  where E 
represents a transition corresponding to execution of a malicious instruction in 
memory.  
The kernel object memory profiling procedure based on presented formalization is 
defined as 3-tuple,   ⟦      〈  〉⟧,  where: 
 I is a set of execution states, each representing an instruction in 
determined malicious executable.   
 E is a set of edges corresponds to transition to an instruction. 
   〈  〉 is the profiling procedure that acquire a snapshot of memory 
allocated to malicious kernel object at execution of an instruction   . 
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Figure 3 presents a practical example of modeling a malicious executable, and 
creating a profile of memory allocated to kernel objects in dynamic kernel memory. 
Code in Figure 3 is modeled as a CFG graph. Each instruction is modeled as an 
execution state, and execution of next instruction is represented as a transition in the 
CFG graph. Instructions similar to those presented in line 4 represents a branching 
transition of the CFG graph to instructions located at Loc_30902E in memory. 
Through execution of the malware CFG modeled graph, malicious kernel objects are 
profiled using presented method, and added to the malicious kernel object profiling 
space.  
Intuitively, the object profile space can, as well, be modeled as CFG of profiles 
analogy to code CFG. Profile CFG illustrated in Figure 3 represents an EPROCESS 
object of a running malicious process in Windows operating system kernel. 
Consecutive memory snapshots are acquired for malicious object through malicious 
code execution in a managed environment.  Acquired memory profiles are, then, used 
to determine malicious EPROCESS kernel objects in a digital forensic investigation of 
memory images that infected with profiled malware sample.    
4 Implementation and Case Study 
Implementing a prototype dynamic kernel object profiler for digital forensic 
investigation purpose requires dynamic access to memory regions allocated to 
malicious kernel objects and monitoring executed instructions by malicious code. 
That is, QEMU [35], an open source processor emulator was used to accomplish 
aforementioned requirements. QEMU was customized to allow instruction emulation 
to stimulate proposed kernel object profiling procedure. Note that, in this research, 
# INS Argument 
1 push dwDesiredAccess 
2 call ds:openMutex 
3 cmp [ebp+var_4] , eax 
4 Jz Short loc_30902E 
5 push offset Name 
6 push 0 
7 push 0 
8 call ds:createMutex 
loc_30902E 
9 push 0 
10 call ds:exit 
loc_30903A 
11 mov esp , ebp 
12 pop esp 
13 retn  
 
 
          Figure 3: Executed Code CFG to Memory Profiles Snapshots CFG. 
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Windows operating system kernel is approached for presented profiling process, 
specifically dynamic kernel objects that represent running process in Windows, such 
as, EPROCESS and its substructures: _KPROCESS and _KTHREAD. This is because 
EPROCESS kernel object is a common target for forensic investigators of malware 
and references different types of kernel objects that are essential to the investigation. 
For example, EPROCESS keeps track of memory allocated to a program through the 
Virtual Address Descriptor data structure, and files mapped in memory [36]. 
Determining memory regions allocated to a program in QEMU is accomplished 
through monitoring the value loaded into CR3 processer registers. This value 
represents the page-directory base register (PDBR) of physical memory address of 
current program’s process loaded into QEMU processor [32]. Monitoring the 
aforementioned register enables determining the physical memory address of 
currently loaded EPROCESS into the emulation processer. Once memory region for 
an EPROCESS is determined, the memory region is mapped to the formal definition 
of EPROCESS as described in Windows operating system kernel specification to 
identify the offset of each property in monitored object and its value. Finally, the 
proposed profiling procedure snapshots identified memory offsets, as previously 
described, at invocation of emulated instructions in QEMU processor. Acquired 
malicious EPROCSS profiles are, then, used to automate identifying if a kernel 
objects is malicious or not in post-mortem analysis of a memory.  
        To automate the process of malicious EPROCESS extraction and identification, a 
plugin to Volatility Memory Forensic Framework [26] developed to automatically 
extract kernel objects and match extracted objects with developed malware profiles. If 
an extracted object matches a profile, memory regions allocated to the suspect 
program and referenced by the suspect EPROCESS are automatically extracted for 
further forensic analysis. 
4.1 Zeus Toolkit Profiling Case Study 
To evaluate the efficacy of the proposed method, a forensic profile for Zeus 
malware [37] was developed. Zeus is a toolkit that is commonly used to commit 
financial crimes on the Internet [37]. In the last few years, Zeus toolkit has become a 
dominant tool for cyber criminals since it allows to, easily, configure a malicious 
binaries to commit a variety of cybercrimes, such as stealing the users’ Internet 
baking accounts and credit card information and leaking user-sensitive financial 
information to a black market.  
To verify developed Zeus’s profiles, four Windows 7 virtual machines infected 
with Zeus malware were deployed. Dynamic kernel memory of each infected VM 
acquired for analysis, and matched with developed Zeus profiles. Kernel objects in 
each forensic memory image have been processed using Volatility with developed 
extraction and identification plugin. 
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This allows automatic identification of malicious kernel objects related to Zeus, and 
also automatically extracted memory regions referenced by Zeus’s EPROCESS kernel 
object. 
Table 1 shows the results of Zeus’s profiling process and characteristics of each 
acquired forensic memory image for investigation. As shown in Table 1, Zeus’s 
Kernel Object Profile (OP) is consists of up-to 4500 object memory snapshots. 
In essence, acquired memory snapshots of Zeus’s kernel object correspond to 
emulated instructions of Zeus’s executable and executed states in Zeus’s modeled 
CFG graph, as previously described. In addition, each acquired memory image has 
up-to 60 EPROCESS kernel objects for commonly-used benign software e.g. 
Microsoft Internet Explorer, MS Media Player, and MS Office.  
Matching extracted kernel objects with acquired profiles resulted in identification of 
Zeus’s EPROCESS objects in all memory images without producing false positives 
with benign EPROCESS objects. Furthermore, to verify the preciseness of acquired 
profiles, Zeus’s profiles have been used to investigate freely available [26] seven 
different Windows XP SP2 forensic memory images infected with different malware 
samples. Developed profiles, however, did not produce false results with other 
malicious kernel objects.      
5 Discussion and Future Work  
Although presented profiling method shows promising results in determining 
characteristics of malicious kernel objects and automating malicious kernel object 
identification in post-mortem memory analysis, some improvements are required. 
The proposed method is considered a complementary approach for dynamic analysis 
techniques; thus, challenges to dynamic analysis approaches may, also, affect the 
proposed method. For example, to develop a complete object profile, all execution 
paths in malicious code’s CFG graph have to be considered.  therwise, if a malicious 
code has multiple execution paths, proposed method may results in incomplete 
profiles and may produce false results. Thus, the proposed method has to be assisted 
with proposed improvements to dynamic analysis approaches for digital forensic 
investigation. 
 
Zeus  
Variants 
Acquired 
memory 
Snapshots 
# Benign 
Kernel Objects  
False 
Detections 
ntos.exe 4511 64 - 
oembios.exe 4009 52 - 
Sdra64.exe 3794 52 - 
PP08.exe 3401 43 - 
 
Table 1: Results of Profiling the CFG Graphs Corresponds to Zeus’s Executable 
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Hence, our future work plan includes approaching proposed dynamic analysis 
improvements and implementing improved approaches in a forensic-specific malware 
investigation platform.            
6 Conclusion  
This research highlighted the limitations of employing dynamic malware analysis 
approaches in digital forensic investigations of malware, and proposed a set of 
improvements to presented limitations. Based on highlighted limitations, a method 
proposed to profile malicious kernel objects in dynamic kernel memory. Developed 
malware profiles allow investigators to automatically identify malicious kernel 
objects during post-mortem memory analysis of acquired dynamic kernel memory of 
the victim’s computer. To allow an automated profiling of malicious kernel objects, a 
prototype malware sandbox solution developed and used to profile a malware family 
that is commonly used to commit finical crime on the Internet.     
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